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Abstract
Contemporary comparative law and comparative legal scholarship have generally been 
marked by constructivist purposes, as a means for state building and local law reform. In this 
sense they have lent support to the idea of law being an exclusively national phenomenon. 
However, as a result of globalization, the question is whether the discipline, as it stands now, 
is fit for dealing with an ever more interdependent world. The answer might well be in the 
negative, with a result that comparative lawyers have to adapt their analytical and 
educational toolkits to ones other than constructivist purposes, and also to the realities of a 
largely fragmented and fluid regulatory landscape. At least three challenges stand out with 
regard to changing comparative law from a marginal and static discipline into a central and 
dynamic one: the objects of comparative law; the role of comparative law in the law 
curriculum and the type of research a dynamic approach to comparative law requires.
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1. Comparative Law as a Marginal and Static Discipline
Patrick Glenn has aptly and repeatedly observed that for a long time com-
parative law and comparative legal scholarship1 have generally been 
marked by constructivist purposes: as a means for state building and local 
law reform.2 In this sense comparative law lent support to the idea of law 
1 In the remainder of this text the term ‘comparative law’ is taken to include ‘comparative 
legal scholarship’.
2 PJ Glenn, ‘The Nationalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press 2003) 76-99 and PJ 
Glenn, ‘A Transnational Concept of Law’ in P Cane and M Tushnet (eds), The Oxford 
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being an exclusively national phenomenon and an instrument in the 
nationalization of the law. Looking at the region where I come from, 
i.e. continental Europe: up until the nineteenth century, when the nation 
state was in formation for some time already,3 there were quite some non-
binding - secondary or supplementary - legal sources available, which inter-
acted or competed with each other: e.g., canonical law, local statutes, 
custom, case law, Roman law (the overarching and unifying source), and, 
yes, the Bible (the latter the most ‘binding’ of all!). It was more specifically 
the ideal of codification - prominently entering the legal scene in the wake 
of the French revolution4 - which wanted to put an end to this situation: law 
was identified exclusively with written and national law.5 National codified 
law was on the one hand to be the exclusive source of law, identifiable 
through a local Grundnorm or rule of recognition,6 and should on the other 
hand contain the solution for about every situation conceivable (law’s 
adequacy).7
So although, paradoxically, the content of national law was the result of 
the mining of comparative sources,8 extra-national inspiration was not 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2003) 839-862. In what has arguably for 
a long time been the most influential handbook of the discipline of comparative law, this 
constructivist approach is very much promoted: K Zweigert and H Kötz, Introduction to 
Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 1998) 11: ‘In its applied version, comparative law 
suggests how a specific problem can most appropriately be solved under the given social 
and economic circumstances.’ (similar statements can be found throughout the introduc-
tory and methodological chapters of the book by Zweigert and Kötz).
3 The rise of the nation state is of course a complex, and dialectic development. Usually 
one is referred to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the starting point of the nation state, 
although the concept of the state as such has developed from the thirteenth century 
onwards. For nuance and details I refer to M van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State 
(Cambridge University Press 1999). The use of the term ‘state’ came into use in the first part 
of the seventeenth century.
4 Just as the concept of the nation state, the concept of codification didn’t emerge during 
a fixed and clearly identifiable period in time. It was however after the French revolution 
that it gained momentum. For nuance and details I refer to P van den Berg, The Politics of 
European Codification. A History of the Unification of Law in France, Prussia, the Austrian 
Monarchy and the Netherlands (Europa Law Publishing 2006).
5 It even suffered, as Gény said, from a ‘fétichisme de la loi écrite codifiée.’ F Gény 
Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif: essai critique (Librairie Génerale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence 1919) 70.
6 These terms of course come from H Kelsen and HLA Hart respectively. On the neglect 
of Hart of comparative legal scholarship see the recent (posthumously published) mono-
graph by AWB Simpson, Reflections on ‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford University Press 2011) 
157-160. The universalistic aspirations of his concept of law didn’t seem to really invite Hart 
for comparative observations. It could and should have, though.
7 PC Kop, Legisme en Privaatrechtswetenschap (Kluwer 1982) 2-3.
8 See Glenn (n 2) 84.
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really felt to be a necessity anymore. National law was thought to be self-
supporting, and the legal system was predominantly understood as an 
entity in which ‘demos’, law creation and a specific and delineated area 
were intimately bound. Since the nineteenth century it was: La Nation, la 
loi, le roi - in that order.9 As a result comparative law ‘blossomed’ as a static 
discipline in the margin, both in terms of the law school’s curriculum and 
in terms of research;10 an intellectual pastime if there ever was one.
In recent years comparative law has witnessed a revival, especially due to 
European unification processes.11 However, as a result of globalization – 
which with Twining can loosely be described as the developments and 
interactions which are making the world more interdependent with respect 
to ecology, economy, communications, language, politics, etc12 - the ques-
tion is if the discipline as it stands now is fit for purpose, i.e., dealing with 
this ever more interdependent world. In my opinion the answer is in the 
negative, and comparative lawyers have to adapt their analytical and edu-
cational toolkits to other than constructivist purposes, and also to the reali-
ties of a largely fragmented and fluid regulatory landscape.13 At least three 
challenges stand out.
2. Comparative Law as a Central and Dynamic Discipline:  
Three Challenges
As a result of the foregoing (‘constructivism’) most comparative law is still 
typically concerned with traditional legal questions: what is the law in at 
least two jurisdictions and how do they compare? The applicable legal 
9 Rousseau’s thinking has been of great influence here. See J Miller, Rousseau. Dreamer of 
Democracy (Yale University Press 1984). A similar development as just described with regard 
to the process of codification in continental Europe could be witnessed in the common law 
through the evolution of the doctrine of stare decisis, which was only firmly rooted in the 
English legal system by the end of the nineteenth century. On this J Evans, ‘Change in the 
Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century’, in L Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law 
(Oxford University Press 1987) 35-72.
10 A comparative approach in any case seems sometimes to be more a matter of being en 
vogue, instead of really bringing useful insights to the issue being researched. M-C 
Ponthoreau, ‘Le droit comparé en question(s). Entre pragmatisme et outil épistémologique’ 
57 Revue internationale de droit comparé 2005, 9.
11 A process which is very much building on the traditional constructivist ambitions of 
comparative law too.
12 W Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press 2000) 4.
13 P Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law 
as a Critique of Global Governance’ in M Adams and J Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in 
Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 189-190.
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norms in the different jurisdictions have to be identified and described 
with an eye to their subsequent systematization and the identification 
of similarities and differences. In a globalizing world however, compara-
tive law should also self-consciously and explicitly encompass a dynamic 
approach to supplement its customary and more static perspective, to be 
able to answer questions such as: how do the societal changes that occur as 
a result of globalization impact on the configuration of legal traditions or 
cultures; how do these adapt or maintain their distinctiveness; how is law 
used in relation with other legal cultures and traditions; how do new legal 
configurations become assimilated, rejected or refashioned in a host legal 
system, etc?14 In doing so we have to expand comparative law’s traditional 
focus on municipal law of western nations.15
Another clear implication of globalization is that the nature of legal edu-
cation will have to change. ‘Neither a nationally confined doctrinal instruc-
tion in the rules and methods of a particular field in a given country nor the, 
more often than not, relatively randomly chosen jurisdiction of compari-
son, can provide for an adequate training of the soon to be graduate legal 
scholar – or practitioner’, Zumbansen recently wrote.16 Legal education has 
to shift from a purely local approach, to what we might call an integrated 
approach that can make more sense of legal dynamics and diversity. This is 
comparative law broadly defined. We are nevertheless still struggling to 
build in such an approach into the law school curriculum; an approach that 
also deals with the questions identified in the previous paragraph.17 Many 
options present themselves (all having advantages and disadvantages): 
starting law school with teaching broadly accepted legal principles as 
they are currently unfolding, thereafter integrating how different jurisdic-
tions have integrated these principles, and finally situating this in an 
ever more interdependent (legal) world; or teaching comparative law as a 
separate graduate curriculum (after having gone through a thorough tradi-
tional national education); or integrating a global and dynamic perspective 
14 H Muir Watt, ‘Globalization and Comparative Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 589 (with 
further references).
15 This is the so-called ‘Country and Western’ tradition, contrasting especially between 
the ‘parent’ civil and common law systems, and mostly dealing with private law. Twining 
(n 12) 185-187.
16 Zumbansen (n 13) 188.
17 Interesting proposals and ideas can be found in J Husa, ‘Turning the Curriculum 
Upside Down’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 913 and S Chesterman, ‘The Evolution of Legal 
Education: Internationalization, Transnationalization, Globalization’ (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal 877 (with many references).
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throughout the curriculum (i.e., an approach that also puts perspective - 
even subversive perspective18 - to national law); etc.
In line with all this, globalization also requires a renewed research 
agenda. This however calls for a resort to other disciplines than the law; 
interdisciplinarity is the key here. But how much or what type of interdisci-
plinarity is needed for answering the type of questions that are raised by 
globalization? In particular, the humanities and social sciences are impor-
tant. We should nevertheless avoid as much as possible the legal researcher 
from becoming a ‘jack of all trades (and a master of none)’. From a practical 
point of view, this issue is relevant because depending on the mode or 
intensity of interdisciplinarity, comparative lawyers may experience fewer 
or more difficulties while doing research. I would be pragmatic here: all 
this does not mean that scholars engaging in comparative law need to be 
fully versatile in other disciplines besides their own, at least not in terms 
of being able to do the type of research that is typical of these other 
disciplines. But they must in any case be able to build on these other 
disciplines.19
3. Final Observations
The issue for comparative law is not whether or not the nation state will 
sooner or later fade way. I don’t think it will, at least not in the foreseeable 
future. Let it also be clear that depending on the topic to be dealt with, it is 
to a greater or lesser extent still possible and sensible to engage in tradi-
tional multi-jurisdictional – i.e. state-centered – comparative law. So, too, 
will the long established purposes and aims of comparative law continue to 
be relevant for many years to come (including its constructivist purposes).20 
Globalization is nevertheless challenging the state-centered approach 
to comparative law as being the exclusive one. Globalization is a very 
complex and hybrid phenomenon, and law is no longer parochial nor fully 
18 G Fletcher, ‘Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline’ (1998) 46 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 683.
19 This is by the way not a plea for excluding strong interdisciplinary perspectives alto-
gether, but realistically that might well require group work. For a helpful overview of dimen-
sions of interdisciplinary legal research, see BMJ van Klink and HS Taekema, ‘On the Border: 
Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research’ in BMJ van Klink and HS Taekema 
(eds), Law and Method. Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Mohr Siebeck 2011) 7-32.
20 See on these aims: G Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or 
Differences?’ in Reimann and Zimmermann (n 14) 401-406.
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cosmopolitan: ‘it includes empires, spheres of influence, alliances, coali-
tions, religious diasporas, networks, trade routes, migration flows, and 
social movements. It also includes sub-worlds such as the common law 
world, the Arab world, the Islamic world and Christendom, as well as 
special groupings of power such as the G7, the G8, NATO, OPEC, the 
European Union, the Commonwealth, multi-national corporations, crime 
syndicates, cartels, social movements, and non-governmental organisa-
tions and networks. All of these cut across any simple vertical hierarchy 
and overlap and interact with each other in complex ways. These com-
plexities are reflected in the diversity of forms of normative and legal 
ordering.’21
If comparative law does not want to become a marginal discipline again, 
or even fade away into oblivion, we have to rethink its role as a scholarly 
discipline and as an integrated and dynamic part of the law school curricu-
lum. It should in any case be clear that in an increasingly interdependent 
era that makes ever greater demands on our ability to understand the world 
with which we are confronted, comparative law can be of tangible benefit 
and a center-piece of legal education and research. All this of course makes 
the task of comparative law even more complex than it already was: inte-
grating globalization into the legal discipline raises questions of feasibility 
and practicality, of what still should/can be national to legal education, of 
how much non-law should be part of the curriculum, of making lawyers 
sensitive of the non-orderly world of borders and non-borders, etc. The 
challenges are formidable indeed, but they cannot be ignored.
21 W Twining, ‘Globalisation and Comparative Law’ in E Örücü and D Nelken, 
Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 70.
